ventilation in the spread of airborne pathogens is of utmost importance for protecting the public's health.
Air ventilation in healthcare environments presents unique challenges due to the collocation of patients, visitors, and healthcare workers because some of them may be infectious and/or immunocompromised.
Highly infectious diseases (HIDs) are defined as viral and bacterial infections that are easily transmissible, cause serious life-threatening illness, have no or few treatment options, and pose a threat to the general public. 8 Patients suspected or confirmed to be infected by HIDs require care in isolation rooms or specialized biocontainment areas in hospitals to prevent exposure of healthcare workers, visitors, and other patients to the person with the HID. 9 Standard and transmissionbased isolation precautions to prevent contact with the patient and their droplet secretions (eg, mucus from sneezing or coughing) include the use of personal protective equipment (PPE), such as gloves, masks, gowns, and eye protection. 10, 11 In addition to the use of PPE, airborne transmission-based precautions include special air-handling and ventilation systems, such as negative-pressure airborne infection isolation rooms (AIIRs), to prevent the dissemination of airborne droplet nuclei or small particles to areas where noninfected individuals are present, and to remove airborne pathogens by air filtration. 10, 11 When a patient infected with a respiratory pathogen coughs or sneezes, thousands of droplets are expelled, ranging in size from ~0.05 to 500 μm; the majority of these particles range in size from 10 to 100 μm. 12, 13 The smaller range of droplets can rapidly desiccate to form droplet nuclei (ie, particles ≤5 μm in diameter) that can contain infectious pathogens. [11] [12] [13] [14] Droplet nuclei are assumed to have such low settling velocities that this results in extended airborne suspension times, on the order of hours, resulting in particle transport over long distances (eg, >1 m). 12, 15 This long-distance aerosol dissemination is mainly determined by airflow patterns in the built environment as generated by ventilation systems and movement of personnel. 15 Previous research has illustrated the potential for widespread airborne dissemination within a hospital driven by the building's air ventilation systems, including nosocomial outbreaks of MERS and SARS. 16, 17 One type of specialized healthcare environment, a clinical biocontainment unit (BCU), is designed to care for patients infected with HIDs and incorporates specialized environmental controls and isolation protocols to prevent pathogen transmission. In response to the 2014-2015 Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak, Johns
Hopkins Medicine created a BCU by redesigning and renovating existing clinical space. 18 The Johns Hopkins BCU (JH-BCU), along with nine others around the United States, were funded by the
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
(ASPR) to serve as Regional Ebola and other Special Pathogen Treatment Centers (RESPTCs). These centers have enhanced capabilities to care for patients and offer fully contained routine laboratory diagnostics and testing of bio-specimens from patients infected with or suspected to be infected with high-consequence pathogens, such as viral hemorrhagic fevers and highly drug resistant Mycobacterium tuberculosis (TB). 18, 19 Similar to other BCUs, the JH-BCU includes the capability to isolate airborne pathogen transmission via negatively pressurized patient rooms and a negative pressure laboratory space. 18 While general guidance was provided to aid RESPTCs by defining the minimum requirements needed for treating patients, such as private patient rooms with their own bathrooms, there was no specific guidance provided on engineering or HVAC (heating, ventilation and air-conditioning) design needs to maintain airborne pathogen isolation within those rooms. 20 Guidelines are available from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) for preventing transmission of airborne pathogens, such as TB, in healthcare settings, 11,21 but there are currently no guidelines specific to BCUs. Furthermore, there are no formal, mandated guidelines for BCU design, construction, and capabilities; therefore, specifications vary among the facilities, and there are no data to date examining the efficiency of any BCU environment to maintain isolation of airborne infectious particles.
8,22,23
Practical Implications
• A systematic method is provided for using fluorescent tracer particles to characterize the isolation capabilities of a clinical biocontainment unit (BCU) under two different HVAC (heating, ventilation, air-conditioning) operating conditions: normal operation and loss of negative pressure due to HVAC exhaust failure.
• During normal HVAC operation, there were no tracer particles detected outside of the patient isolation room suggesting that the patient room's negative pressure differential and exhaust vents operated sufficiently to maintain airborne isolation conditions.
• However, during HVAC exhaust failure, while the patient room still contained the majority of the contaminated air, ~6% of fluorescent tracer particles were detected in areas adjacent to the patient isolation room suggesting that the current protocols used by the HVAC automation system to increase airflow into these adjacent spaces during emergency loss of exhaust capabilities is insufficient to maintain complete airborne isolation conditions.
• Since it is hypothesized that particles were transported out of the patient room through cracks in the doors and door handles, it should be further investigated how to improve the seal on these doors to improve the airborne isolation capabilities.
• Further investigation is needed to identify safe BCU protocols that can be used during the emergency loss of negative pressure, such as required use of respiratory personal protective equipment in all areas of the BCU.
Recently, Drewry et al 24 presented a study to investigate the potential for healthcare worker (HCW) exposure to simulant airborne pathogens while working in the JH-BCU. The goal was to develop a safe and effective method that could be used by BCUs to evaluate potential failure points of PPE to reduce the risk of exposure to infectious particles. The objective of this study was to provide the first investigation of a BCU's ability to contain aerosolized simulant fluorescent pathogen particles under different F I G U R E 1 (A) An illustration of the Johns Hopkins Hospital biocontainment unit (JH-BCU) depicting room types. Red areas are the three patient rooms, labeled rooms 1-3, and the laboratory space for processing samples (room 4). There is a dedicated space for putting on personal protective equipment (PPE) (ie, donning) which is shared by patient rooms 1 and 2 (room 5), as well as a shared donning space between patient room 3 and the laboratory (room 6). Each of the red spaces have areas for removal of PPE (ie, doffing), labeled as the yellow rooms 7-10. Area 11 is a nurses' station. All green areas do not require the use of PPE according to the JH-BCU standard protocols while red areas do require PPE. For more details, see Garibaldi et al 18 (B) Overview of the JH-BCU space with the number of air changes per hour per room during normal HVAC (heating, ventilation, air-conditioning) operation, and the directional movement of personnel between spaces to minimize risk for contamination of clean zones (arrows). (C) Locations in the JH-BCU for the release of fluorescent tracer particles from the Collison nebulizer ("CN" in figure) , and eight IBAC (Instantaneous Biological Analyzer and Collector, FLIR Systems) sensors for detecting and measuring fluorescent particle concentrations and dissemination pattern. The IBAC locations in order include: (1) patient room, (2) PPE doffing room, (3-6) hallway, (7) PPE donning room, and (8) nurses' station HVAC operating conditions. These experiments were conducted to investigate the airborne isolation capabilities of a JH-BCU patient room in the absence of any HCW movement or activity; that is, particle dissemination via airflow patterns alone. Considering the number of BCUs currently in operation (there are currently 11), the lack of formal guidelines for BCU safety controls, and the everpresent threat of naturally or intentionally spread HIDs, 23 there is a critical need for systematic research addressing the safety of BCU facilities and protocols. The methodologies presented below provide a testing framework that can be used across multiple BCU facilities and other indoor air environments to evaluate dispersion patterns and minimize the risk for exposure to and transmission of airborne pathogens.
| TE S T FACILIT Y, S TUDY DE S I G N AND ME THODS

| Air-handling system of the JH-BCU
The air-handling system of the JH-BCU was designed based on the airborne precautions guidance documents of the CDC and ASHRAE for preventing transmission of airborne particles containing infectious microorganisms in general healthcare settings. 11, 21 Figure 1A illustrates the different rooms and areas in the JH-BCU. Figure 1B 
| Test scenarios
This study investigated the effectiveness of the JH-BCU to contain Storm Sandy, two hospitals in New York City were forced to evacuate, including Bellevue Hospital, after two days on backup generator power. 31 In this study, three repeat trials were conducted for both HVAC test conditions. The exhaust failure trials were conducted by coordinating with the facility manager to turn off the JH-BCU HEPA exhaust system. As described above, the exhaust system has two fans; both fans were off during the exhaust failure trials. According to the exhaust failure standard operating protocol of the JH-BCU, this results in automatic shut off of the building supply air to the areas of the JH-BCU that are assumed to be contaminated (ie, the three patient rooms, laboratory, and the dirty side of the autoclave room) in order to reduce further disruption of the pressure differentials. The air-handling system's automation system maximizes airflow to the clean areas of the JH-BCU by increasing supply air to these clean areas to push particles from the rest of the unit toward the contaminated areas. In addition, an emergency backup power supply provides power to ductless cooling/heating units in the patient rooms; these units can be operated by the staff to maintain air circulation and provide comfort. During the exhaust failure trial, the effect of turning off the ductless cooling/heating units in the patient room was also investigated to observe how this influenced particle dissemination and transport. The rationale for using the selected suspension to produce the tracer particles was fourfold. First, the use of optical brightener powder is a cost-effective option at a cost of $0.40/g of powder.
| Nebulization of fluorescent tracer particles
Second, the nebulized particles are fluorescent allowing for feasible real-time tracing of the airborne particle number concentrations and dissemination patterns using fluorescent aerosol sensors as described below. Third, the optical brightener powder is a safe, nontoxic material approved for release into public environments by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 32 Fourth, the size of particles produced by nebulizing the suspension range from 0.5 to 5 μm, with the highest number concentration of particles being ~1 μm aerodynamic diameter ( Figure 2 ). As defined by the World Health Organization, droplet nuclei are ≤5 μm in diameter. 14 Thus, the resultant particle number size distribution produced by nebulizing the suspension was representative of infectious respiratory aerosols that can be transmitted as droplet nuclei via the airborne route through breathing, talking, coughing, or sneezing. 13 
| Fluorescent tracer particles-particle number size distribution measurement
The particle number size distribution for the nebulized fluorescent suspension was investigated before conducting testing. For detailed explanation of the chamber setup used to conduct these measurements, see Ratnesar-Shumate et al 33 Briefly, the optical brightener/urea/water suspension was nebulized using a Sono-Tek ultrasonic atomizer (nozzle power setting = 3 watts, liquid injection rate = 100 μL/min) (Sono-Tek Corporation, Milton, NY, USA). The particles were allowed sufficient time to desiccate to a core particle size in aerosol capacitance chambers, well-mixed using a high chamber flowrate (2500 L/min), and sampled isokinetically to measure particle size and number concentration using a UVAPS (Ultraviolet Aerodynamic Particle Sizer, Model 3314, TSI Inc., Shoreview, MN, USA). While a Sono-Tek atomizer was used for chamber measurements, the Collison nebulizer was used during the JH-BCU experiments due to its ease of transport and setup. Also, since the experimental repeats conducted in the JH-BCU monitored particle dissemination for 20-min post-nebulization, chamber desiccation was used during the measurements of the suspension's particle number size distribution to mimic aerosol aging; thus, the nebulized particles were dried to a solid, core size to simulate droplet nuclei. 34 Further, as described below in results, nebulization of the fluorescent suspension by the Collison nebulizer during experiments at the JH-BCU was found to produce a particle number size distribution with 82.3% ± 0.8% of the particles in the 0.5 to 1.7 μm size range.
In comparison, the particle number size distribution produced by the Sono-Tek atomizer resulted in 87.4% ± 2.5% of particles in the 0.5 to 1.7 μm size range. Therefore, the chamber measurements of the fluorescent suspension's particle number size distribution are The particles are binned into two size categories: 0.5-1.7 and 1.7-10 μm. 36 The IBACs used in this study were within calibration, and particle concentration, particle sizing, and fluorescence were confirmed to be within tolerance prior to conducting testing using fluorescent polystyrene latex spheres of known size (2 μm, Thermo Scientific, Waltham, MA, USA).
As illustrated in Figure 1C These doors are not used when a patient is present and are taped off to alert HCWs not to enter/exit through these doors.
Supply/outlet vent placement near patients has been suggested to be a better predictor for the removal of airborne bacteria in isolation rooms than air change rate alone. 41, 42 For example, previous research has shown that ceiling level exhausts are more efficient than floor level exhausts for removing fine respiratory particles in hospital isolation rooms. 27 Huang and Tsao 41 suggest locating three exhaust vents (60*60 cm) arranged with one on the ceiling and two on both side walls of the patient's bed. However, practical limitations during the design and building process should also be considered; the inlet and outlet vent locations in the JH-BCU were selected in the patient room to be furthest from the doors and closest to the patient beds so that the net airflow of the patient room moves across the patient and then exits. It was also desired to locate the exhaust vents as far as practically possible from the donning and doffing room doors to remove particles away from these corridors to reduce the risk of particles entering into these spaces when the doors open. 43 Furthermore, in the present experiments in the JH-BCU under normal HVAC conditions, the exhaust vents appear to sufficiently remove released tracer particles.
| Fluorescent particle concentrations and dissemination under different HVAC conditions: HVAC exhaust failure condition
During the HVAC exhaust failure trials, the average recorded patient As illustrated in Figure 3 , the exhaust failure condition resulted in transport of particles from the patient room where the fluorescent particles were released into the doffing room and certain hallway locations (IBAC locations 2, 4, and 5 in Figure 1C ). In the patient room, the average fluorescent particle number concentration was doffing space, and <1% may have been transported to the hallway.
The total volume of the patient room, doffing room, and corridor space is 109.4, 54.7, and 328.1 m 3 , respectively. To estimate the percentage of the total number of particles that were transported out of the patient room, the average particle number concentrations detected by each of the IBACs throughout the exhaust failure trials were multiplied by their total room volume to estimate the number of particles in each location (ie, patient room, doffing room, and hallway). Assuming that the sum of all particle counts across the JH-BCU space was the total number of particles released, the percentages of the total that were transported out of the patient room and into the doffing space and hallway corridor were calculated. It was also assumed that the airborne particle number concentrations detected by the IBACs in each location was representative of that entire room, and that the rooms were well mixed. For the hallway, an average was calculated across the multiple IBACs located there. Figure 1A , IBAC #2 in Figure 1C ) and green (hallway, IBAC #4 and #5 in Figure 1C) zones.
Drewry et al 24 also noted the presence of simulant pathogen particles in the JH-BCU doffing room following simulated patient care and doffing procedures. The key difference between the present study and the study of Drewry et al 24 is that there were no HCWs in the present study; that is, particle dissemination was observed as a result of airflow patterns alone while manipulating HVAC condition. Therefore, the potential for HCW exposure to airborne pathogens is of concern in the doffing room due to multiple potential scenarios for this contamination. Thus far, between the present study and Drewry et al, 24 these identified scenarios include HVAC exhaust failure, re-aerosolization of particles deposited on the outside of HCW's PPE during doffing, and/or particle transport from the patient room after opening the door between the two spaces.
The potential risk for an individual to acquire an infection depends partially on the dose of the inhaled pathogen, which is governed by the airborne pathogen concentration, the individual's breathing rate, and exposure duration in the room. 15, 44 For pathogens such as TB and variola (smallpox) virus, the infectious dose may be as low as a single microorganism. 44, 45 While it may seem unlikely for a patient to present with smallpox, the potential for Also, since it is hypothesized that particles were transported out of the patient room through cracks in the doors, another recommendation to improve the airborne isolation capabilities of the patient rooms is to replace the hinged doors with sliding doors. 43 Previous research has demonstrated that opening doors can act as a mechanism by which infectious particles can be transported from airborne isolation rooms into adjacent spaces, particularly for
hinged doors that open outward. 15, 48, 49 However, the doors in the present study were kept closed throughout all trials. Nevertheless, the influence of door cracks has been previously investigated as a means for particle transport from outdoors to indoors with particle penetration factor estimates of 0. 
| CON CLUS I ON S AND FUTURE WORK
In this study, we provide a systematic method for characterizing the isolation capabilities of a clinical BCU under two different HVAC therefore, specifications vary among the facilities. 8, 22, 23 The present study provides the first data examining the efficiency of a BCU environment to maintain isolation of released airborne particles.
The methods used in the present study could be applied to evaluate the other BCUs with a focus on providing guidelines to standardize minimum BCU requirements for maintaining airborne isolation conditions. Additionally, the use of polydisperse, fluorescent tracer particles in combination with a networked array of real time, fluorescent aerosol sensors could be flexibly applied to other clinical spaces to investigate particle fate and transport throughout facilities. Because the fluorescent tracer particles used in this study (ie, optical brightener suspension) have been approved for release into public spaces, 32 this type of research could be conducted in both empty and occupied spaces to investigate the influence of patient and healthcare provider movement on pathogen simulant transport.
This work could be coupled with and used for validation of numerical simulations to create a more complete picture of aerosol transport in any clinical space.
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